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QUESTIONS PRESENTED
I. Whether the court below correctly held that Sheldrake Pond, an
isolated intrastate playa pond, is not "navigable water" as defined
by the Clean Water Act, 33 U.S.C. §§ 1331(a), 1362(7) & (12)?
Does the amendment to the Clean Water Act, 33 U.S.C. § 1362(7),
adopted eight months after litigation began, apply to this case? If
so, does that amendment extend federal regulatory jurisdiction to
Sheldrake Pond?
II. Whether the court below correctly held that the nexus between
pollution and fill in Sheldrake Pond and interstate commerce is
insufficient to justify federal regulation pursuant to the Commerce Clause? If so, does the treaty power support such
regulation?
III. Whether the court below correctly held that shot and skeet
used for its intended purpose is not "solid waste" when it falls to
the ground under the EPA's definition of solid waste in 40 CFR
§ 261.2 as the term applies to BOG's citizen suit under 42 U.S.C.
§ 6972(a)(1)(A)?
IV. Whether the court below correctly held that shot and skeet
used for its intended purpose is not "solid waste" when it falls to
the ground under the statutory definition of solid waste applicable
to BOG's citizen suit under 42 U.S.C. § 6972(a)(1)(B)?
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STATEMENT OF THE CASE
This is an appeal from an order entered by Judge Romulus in
the United States District Court for the District of New Union.
Judge Romulus granted summary judgment in favor of the defendant and dismissed all claims against the company.
I.

Statement of the Facts

Sheldrake Pond is an isolated seasonal pond located in
Groveton County, New Union. (Record on Appeal ("R.") at 3, 5).
The pond is "dry during part of the year and never more than four
feet deep and twenty-five acres in extent during the wet part of
the year." (R. at 3). Defendant, Suave Real Properties, Inc.
("Suave"), is a real estate management company organized under
the laws of New Union. (R. at 3). Suave owns the western end of
the pond, as well as the land to the west and south, and the county
owns the remainder of the pond and the land to the east and
south. (R. at 3).
Last year, Suave began operation of a recreational rifle and
skeet shooting facility, the Groveton Rifle and Pistol Association
("GRAPA"), near Sheldrake Pond. (R. at 3). Suave filled a small
portion of the pond on the western end to build a skeet ejection
platform for the GRAPA operation. (R. at 3). Suave ejects skeet
from the platform, and shooters from a pad some distance away
test their skills by attempting to shoot the skeet with shotguns.
(R. at 3). Suave also constructed a firing range, with targets and a
protective berm, south of the pond near its eastern end. (R. at 4).
Suave positioned the berm behind the targets and approximately
fifty feet from the pond. (R. at 4). As with any skeet and firing
9
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range, spent rounds and skeet parts fall to the ground during the
ordinary course of the GRAPA operation. (R. at 3-4).
Plaintiff, Birdwatchers of Groveton, Inc. ("BOG"), is a nonprofit corporation organized under the laws of New Union. (R. at
3). Its members, recreational birdwatchers, live and watch birds
in Groveton County. (R. at 3). During the last two decades, BOG
members observed over two hundred bird species, including many
that migrate between the United States and other countries, in
and around Sheldrake Pond. (R. at 3-4). BOG has not alleged
that the GRAPA operation has in fact harmed any birds. (R. at 34).
II.

Procedural History

BOG filed this action against Suave on December 20, 2000.1
(R. at 3). BOG alleged that Suave violated 16 U.S.C. § 1311(a)
(1994) in two respects. First, that filling a small portion of Sheldrake Pond for a skeet ejection platform "constitutes discharging
fill material into navigable waters without" a Section 1344 permit.
(R. at 4). Second, that fallen skeet and lead shot constitute "either
discharging fill material into navigable waters without a [Section
1344] permit or discharging pollutants into navigable waters
without a [Section 13421 permit." (R. at 4). BOG sought civil penalties and injunctive relief for both counts. (R. at 4).
BOG also alleged that Suave violated two provisions of RCRA.
First, that the use of shot and skeet at the GRAPA range constitutes hazardous waste disposal without a permit in violation of 42
U.S.C. § 6925(a) (1994). (R. at 4). Second, that the used shot and
skeet parts create "an imminent and substantial endangerment"
actionable under 42 U.S.C. § 6972(a)(1)(B) (1994). (R. at 4). BOG
requested civil penalties and injunctive relief for the first RCRA
count and an injunction requiring abatement for the second. (R.
at 4).
The United States filed and was granted a motion to intervene on behalf of the United States Environmental Protection
Agency ("EPA"). (R. at 1). Suave subsequently moved for summary judgment on each count. The EPA joined BOG in opposing
summary judgment on the first, second, and fourth counts, but
supported Suave's motion with respect to the third. (R. at 4).
1. BOG asserted jurisdiction pursuant to the citizen suit provision of the Clean
Water Act (CWA), 33 U.S.C. § 1365 (1994), and the Resource Conservation and Recovery Act (RCRA), 42 U.S.C. § 6972 (1994). (R. at 3).

https://digitalcommons.pace.edu/pelr/vol20/iss1/20
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The district court found no merit to BOG's claims and granted
summary judgment in favor of Suave on all counts. The court held
that Sheldrake Pond was not "navigable water" in the statutory
sense, and beyond the regulatory authority of the federal government in any case. (R. at 7-8). The court also held that the intended use exception applied to both the statutory and regulatory
meanings of "solid waste," thereby exempting the fired shot and
skeet from RCRA's jurisdiction. (R. at 10-11). Suave asks this
Court to affirm the decision of the district court.
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT
I. The CWA does not extend to Sheldrake Pond. The CWA
regulates "navigable waters," defined as "waters of the United
States." Those terms have identifiable limits. Sheldrake Pond is
neither navigable in fact nor adjacent to such waters. The presence of migratory birds is irrelevant. Furthermore, it overextends
constitutional jurisprudence to claim a nexus between interstate
commerce and the regulation of pollution in Sheldrake Pond. Congress did not intend such a result when it promulgated the CWA.
Rather, Congress left the power to regulate isolated, intrastate
ponds with the states.
The recent amendment to the CWA does not alter this conclusion. Retroactive legislation is disfavored in the law. Consequently, courts will not construe statutes and administrative rules
to have retroactive effect unless their express language requires
that result. There is no such language in either the amendment
or the legislative history, and therefore the amendment operates
only prospectively. Absent genuine retroactive application,
neither the amendment nor the accompanying report affects the
scope of the CWA.
II. Application of the CWA to Sheldrake Pond is an unconstitutional extension of federal power. The alleged filling or polluting of an isolated, intrastate pond has no legitimate nexus to
interstate commerce. Federal regulation of the pond would distort
the balance between national and local authority, and eviscerate
the states' traditional powers to regulate land use.
There is no alternative constitutional basis for regulating
Sheldrake Pond. The CWA was promulgated pursuant to the
Commerce Clause, not the treaty power. Most of the CWA is constitutional on its face and in application. The regulation of isolated, intrastate waters, however, is properly left to the states.
11
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III. Fired shot and skeet parts are not "solid waste" when
they fall to the ground as that term is used in either the regulatory or statutory provisions of RCRA. RCRA defines solid waste
as "discarded material." Accordingly, the threshold jurisdictional
requirement for either definition requires that the material first
be discarded. The fired shot and skeet parts in this case have not
been discarded, but rather have fallen to the ground in the ordinary and intended use of the products.
Certain activities are exempt from RCRA's jurisdiction because the activities constitute the intended use of consumer products. Understanding this distinction, courts have held products
such as munitions and insecticides used for their intended purpose are not discarded until some time after serving that intended
purpose. As those courts have recognized, to rule otherwise would
create the absurd result of regulating shot as solid waste when it
is fired - clearly not a result Congress intended when it enacted
RCRA.
ARGUMENT
I.

THE CWA DOES NOT EXTEND FEDERAL
REGULATORY JURISDICTION TO SHELDRAKE
POND

The CWA grants the EPA jurisdiction over "navigable waters," defined as "waters of the United States, including the territorial seas." 33 U.S.C. §§ 1362(7), 1342, 1344 (1994). The EPA
has interpreted this grant, at its broadest, to include: "All other
waters such as intrastate lakes ...playa lakes, or natural ponds
the use, degradation, or destruction of which would affect or could
affect interstate commerce . . . ." 40 C.F.R. § 122.2 (1999). BOG
and the EPA assert that Sheldrake Pond is a playa lake2 and subject to regulation because it "is used in interstate commerce as
part of an interstate and international bird migration pathway
.. (R. at 5). Their argument, however, is undercut by principles of statutory interpretation and rendered wholly impotent by
the Supreme Court's decision in Solid Waste Agency v. United
States Army Corps of Eng'rs, 531 U.S. 159 (2001) ["SWANCC"].
Neither the recent amendment to the CWA nor the accompanying
2. "Playa" means that the water is intermittent. (R. at 5).
3. BOG and the EPA invoke the so called "migratory bird rule," see 51 Fed. Reg.
41217 (1986); 53 Fed. Reg. 20765 (1988), which the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers
("Corps") and the EPA have used to determine their jurisdiction pursuant to coextensive definitions. Compare 40 C.F.R. § 122.2, with 33 C.F.R. § 328.3 (1999).
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Committee Report resurrects their claim. The Court should therefore "avoid the significant constitutional and federalism questions" raised by extending CWA jurisdiction to an isolated,
intrastate pond and affirm the district court's holding.
A.

Sheldrake Pond is not "Navigable Water" Under the CWA

It is axiomatic that "the starting point for interpreting a statute is the language of the statute itself. Absent a clearly expressed legislative intention to the contrary, that language must
ordinarily be regarded as conclusive." Consumer Product Safety
Comm'n v. GTE Sylvania, Inc., 447 U.S. 102, 108 (1980). So too
"that an administrative agency's power to promulgate legislative
regulations is limited to the authority delegated by Congress."
Bowen v. Georgetown Univ. Hosp., 488 U.S. 204, 208 (1988). Accordingly, federal regulatory jurisdiction does not attach unless
Sheldrake Pond is a "water of the United States." After
SWANCC, that conclusion is untenable.
In SWANCC, the Court held that "33 C.F.R. § 328.3(a)(3)
(1999), as clarified and applied.., pursuant to the 'Migratory Bird
Rule,' exceeds the authority granted to the [Corps] under § 404(a)
of the CWA." 531 U.S. at 174 (citations omitted). The Court concluded that neither the text of the CWA nor the legislative history
allow for such a broad jurisdictional rule. Id. at 168, 172-73. The
EPA maintains a coextensive definition of "waters of the United
States," and used the migratory bird rule to "clarify and apply" its
regulations as well. See supra note 2. Accordingly, SWANCC applies with equal force to the EPA, and the EPA cannot rely on the
migratory bird rule to determine its jurisdiction under the CWA.
United States v. Krilich, 152 F. Supp. 2d 983, 988 (N.D. Ill. 2001);
Migratory Bird Rule Does Not Fly with the Supreme Court, 2001
ARMY LAW 39, 41; see also San FranciscoBaykeeper v. Cargill Salt
Div., 263 F.3d 963, 964 (9th Cir. 2001); Rice v. Harken Expl. Co.,
250 F.3d 264, 268-69 (2d Cir. 2001). Indeed, the EPA recognized
SWANCC as having that effect and advised field staff that they
"should no longer rely on the use of waters or wetlands as habitat
for migratory birds as the sole basis for assertion of regulatory
jurisdiction under the CWA." Memorandum from Gary S. Guzy,
General Counsel, EPA and Robert M. Anderson, Chief Counsel,
U.S. Army Corps of Eng'rs, to Distribution List, 1, 3-4 (Jan. 19,
2001), http://www.epa.gov/owow/wetlands/swanccnav.html. Thus,
the migratory bird rule does not support federal regulation of
Sheldrake Pond.
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As the district court correctly concluded, SWANCC also repu4
diated much of the prevailing wisdom with respect to the CWA.
Significantly, the SWANCC Court held that the term "navigable"
had at least the import of revealing "what Congress had in mind
as its authority for enacting the CWA: its traditional jurisdiction
over waters that were or had been navigable in fact or which could
reasonably be so made." 531 U.S. at 172. The Court also concluded that the Corps' application of their regulations to the isolated, intrastate ponds at issue raised "significant constitutional
and federalism questions," without a clear statement from Congress that it intended such a result. Id. at 173-74. Indeed, the
Court found nothing in the Act or the legislative history that signified "Congress intended to exert anything more than its commerce power over navigation." 5 Id. at 168 n.3. Accordingly, the
Court declined the Corps' "invitation to take what they see as the
next ineluctable step after Riverside Bayview Homes," and refused
to accord any deference to the agency's broad interpretation. Id.
at 171, 174. After SWANCC, whatever the extent of the CWA, it
stops short of "the outer limits of congressional power." See id. at
168 n.3, 172-74; Rice, 250 F.3d at 268; Krilich, 152 F. Supp. 2d at
988.
One circuit has gone even further, holding that "in promulgating 33 C.F.R. § 328(a)(3), the [Corps] exceeded its congressional
authorization under" the CWA. United States v. Wilson, 133 F.3d
251, 257 (4th Cir. 1997). In Wilson, the court concluded that there
was no evidence Congress intended to legislate so broadly and
"[aibsent a clear indication to the contrary, we should not lightly
presume that .

.

. Congress authorized the [Corps] to assert its

jurisdiction in such a sweeping and constitutionally troubling
manner." Id. This holding eliminated the Corps most sweeping
basis for jurisdiction throughout the Fourth Circuit, and the EPA
recognized Wilson as infirming its counterpart definition in that
circuit as well. See Guidance for U.S. Army Corps of Eng'rs and
EPA Field Offices Regarding Clean Water Act Section 404 Juris4. Before SWANCC, it was widely held that "navigable," did nothing to limit the
extent of the CWA. See, e.g., Quivira Min. Co. v. EPA, 765 F.2d 126, 129 (10th Cir.
1985). Many courts also concluded that regulatory jurisdiction under the CWA extended to the limits of congressional power. See, e.g., Leslie Salt Co. v. United States,
896 F.2d 354, 357 (9th Cir. 1990). So too that a court must defer to "reasonable"
agency interpretations of the Act. Id.
5. The Court specifically rejected the argument that S. CONF. REP. No. 92-1236,
at 144 (1972), expressed Congress's intent to extend the CWA to the outer limits of the
Commerce Clause. SWANCC, 531 U.S. at 168 n.3.
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diction Over Isolated Waters in Light of United States v. Wilson,
2-3 (May 28, 1998), withdrawn (Jan. 19, 2001), http://www.epa.
gov/owow/wetlands/wilson.htm.
This Court need not go as far to resolve the issues here, because, as the district court held, it is clear from SWANCC that the
CWA does not extend to Sheldrake Pond. First, the pond is
neither navigable in fact nor adjacent to such waters, (R. at 3),
and thus beyond what the text of the CWA will allow. SWANCC,
531 U.S. at 168, 173. Second, it invokes the "outer limits of congressional power"-particularly without the benefit of the migratory bird rule-to find a sufficient nexus between interstate
commerce and the regulation of fill or pollution in Sheldrake
Pond. See United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549, 567 (1995). Congress, however, did not intend to so extend its power when it
promulgated the CWA. SWANCC, 531 U.S. at 168, 172-74. Finally, extending federal regulatory jurisdiction to local land and
water use issues, such as regulating fill in a seasonal intrastate
pond, raises "significant constitutional and federalism questions,"
which is again contrary to the text of the CWA and the expressed
legislative intent. Id. at 173-74; see also 33 U.S.C. § 1251(b)
(1994) ("It is the policy of Congress to recognize, preserve, and protect the primary responsibility and rights of the states to prevent,
reduce, and eliminate pollution. .. ."). Thus, the CWA to cannot

be construed to regulate isolated, intrastate ponds, 6 and because
EPA cannot exceed its statutory grant, its regulations do not apply to Sheldrake Pond. Suave, 531 U.S. at 172-74. To hold otherwise would contravene the cannons of statutory interpretation
and the clear language of SWANCC.
Absent true retroactive application (addressed infra Section
B), the recent amendment to the CWA cannot alter this conclusion. It is certainly true that a "later law is entitled to weight
when it comes to the problem of construction." Fed. Hous. Auth. v.
Darlington, Inc., 358 U.S. 84, 90 (1958). This interpretive rule,
however, does not apply to cases pending when the later explicative enactment became law. See id.; Red Lion Broadcasting v.
FCC, 395 U.S. 367, 380-82 (1969). In this case, Congress passed
the amendment well after BOG filed its complaint. (R. at 5-6).
6. Although Riverside Bayview Homes, Inc. v. United States, 474 U.S. 121 (1985),
contains some broad language, the Court held only that wetlands adjacent to navigable waters are within the meaning of "waters of the United States." Id. at 131 n.8.
Any argument that Riverside stands for more was rejected in SWANCC. 531 U.S. at
167-68, 171-72.
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Consequently, it would circumvent the rules of retroactive application to give any weight to the amendment without first holding
that, as a matter of law, the amendment governed pending cases.
See INS v. St. Cyr, 121 S. Ct. 2271, 2287-93 (2001). Therefore,
this Court should affirm the district court's holding that SWANCC
precludes federal regulatory jurisdiction over Sheldrake Pond.
B.

The Amendment to the CWA Does Not Operate
Retroactively

"[T]he presumption against retroactive legislation is deeply
rooted in our jurisprudence, and embodies a legal doctrine centuries older than our republic." Landgrafv. USI Film Products, 511
U.S. 244, 265 (1994). Consequently, "congressional enactments
and administrative rules will not be construed to have retroactive
effect unless their language requires this result."7 Bowen, 488
U.S. at 208. Neither the amendment nor its legislative history
contains such a statement, and applying the amendment to the
facts of this case would have a retroactive effect. Therefore, the
amendment operates only prospectively.
1.

Congress did not clearly state that it intended the new
definition of "navigable waters" to operate retroactively

BOG and the EPA ask the Court to apply a change to the
CWA adopted eight months after this case began, and seven
months after the Supreme Court settled the issues of law that
would otherwise govern. (R. at 3, 5-6). Thus, this "case implicates
a federal statute enacted after the event in suit, [and therefore]
the court's first task is to determine whether Congress has expressly prescribed the statute's proper reach." Landgraf,511 U.S.
at 280.
"The standard for finding such unambiguous direction is a demanding one. 'Cases where [the] Court has found truly 'retroactive' effect adequately authorized by statute have involved
statutory language so clear that it could sustain only one interpretation."' St. Cyr, 121 S. Ct. at 2288 (quoting Lindh v. Murphy, 521
U.S. 320, 328 n.4 (1997)) (emphasis added). In contrast, the stat7. Thorpe v. Durham Hous. Auth., 393 U.S. 268 (1969), and Bradley v. Richmond
Scl. Bd., 416 U.S. 696 (1974), were anomalies, see Kaiser Alum. & Chem. Corp. v.
Bonjorno, 494 U.S. 827, 837 (1990); Landgraf, 511 U.S. at 288-90 (Scalia, J., concurring), and neither those nor any subsequent decisions "cast doubt on the traditional
presumption against truly 'retrospective' application of a statute." Landgraff, 511
U.S. at 279.
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ute at issue merely "amended the CWA's definition of 'navigable
waters' to incorporate the EPA's definition of 'waters of the United
States.. . ."' (R. at 5). The amendment was silent as to its temporal scope. (R. at 6).
BOG and the EPA attempt to overcome this deficiency by arguing that the accompanying Committee Report indicates that
Congress intended the amendment to apply retroactively. Id. It
does not. The report is certainly clear as to that committee's intent with respect to the sweep of the CWA, but the report has no
language expressly prescribing its "proper reach" through time.
See S. REP. No. 106-528, at 23 (2001); (R. at 6); cf Martin v.
Hadix, 527 U.S. 345, 352-57 (1999). The Supreme Court has rejected the notion that inferences gleaned, even from the statute
itself, establish congressional intent to apply an enactment retroactively. See, e.g., St. Cyr, 121 S.Ct. at 2287-90. In any case, as
the district court noted, one committee report should not direct
retrospective application where the Conference Committee Report, the House Committee Report and the statute itself are silent.
(R. at 6).
That the amendment is "restorative" is likewise of little import. "[T]he choice to enact a statute that responds to a judicial
decision is quite distinct from the choice to make the responding
statute retroactive." Rivers v. Roadway Express, Inc., 511 U.S.
298, 305 (1994). Following this rule in Rivers, the Court held that
Congress' decision to legislatively overrule an earlier decision was
insufficient to compel retroactive application. Id. at 305-11. The
Court assumed that Congress enacted the statute because it disapproved of the Court's earlier interpretation, and that the legislators believed the Court's decision departed from the
congressional intent and prior interpretations. Id. at 306-07.
Nevertheless, the Court refused to presume that even restorative
statutes apply retroactively. Id. at 311.
Traditionally, the absence of express congressional direction
ended the discussion, because courts presumed that all statutes
operated prospectively. 8 Kaiser, 494 U.S. at 841-44 (Scalia, J.,
8. New procedural rules, statutes either conferring or ousting jurisdiction, and
changes in the propriety of prospective relief will often be applied to pending case.
See Landgraf, 511 U.S. at 273-75. The amendment to the CWA, however, does not
involve a procedural change, but instead broadens federal regulatory powers and potentially imposes a new liability upon Suave. See Lindh, 521 U.S. at 327-28. Nor
does the amendment address the jurisdiction of the federal courts, but rather expands
the sweep of the CWA. Compare Bruner v. United States, 343 U.S. 112, 116-17 (1953),
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concurring). In some recent cases, however, the Court has recognized a second facet to the test: "When... the statute contains no
such express command, the court must determine whether the
new statute would have a retroactive effect ....

If the statute

would operate retroactively, our traditional presumption teaches
that it does not govern absent clear congressional intent favoring
such a result." Landgraf,511 U.S. at 280.
2. The amendment would have a retroactive effect and
therefore operates only prospectively
Applying the newly enacted definition of "navigable waters"
to this case would have a retroactive effect. A statute has a retroactive effect when it "would impair rights a party had when he
acted, increase a party's liability for past conduct, or impose new
duties with respect to transactions already completed." Landgraf,
511 U.S. at 280.
After SWANCC, Sheldrake Pond was beyond the scope of the
CWA. Suave was neither civilly nor criminally liable under federal law for its conduct there, and the GRAPA operation could continue-subject to any applicable state and local regulations. BOG
and the EPA, however, seek to close the GRAPA operation and
impose civil and possibly criminal penalties on Suave. (R. at 4).
Therefore, to apply the amendment to this case would "increase
[Suave's] liability for past conduct [and] impose new duties with
respect to transactions already completed." See Landgraf, 511
U.S. at 280-86. That would plainly alter the legal consequences of
conduct occurring before the amendment's effective date. 9 See
Bowen, 488 U.S. at 219 (Scalia, J., concurring). There is no clear
indication that Congress intended such a result. Cf Landgraf,
511 U.S. at 280. Therefore, SWANCC controls the outcome of this
case.
with Water Pollution Act of 2001, Pub. L. No. 106-720; see also Landgraf,511 U.S. at
274 n.27. The prospective relief exception will be addressed infra note 11.
9. The prospective relief exception comes from Duplex Printing Co. v. Deering,
254 U.S. 443 (1921), where the Court applied a new enactment, governing the propriety of labor injunctions, to a pending case. Id. at 464. In this case, however, BOG
seeks civil penalties as well, (R. at 4), and [rietroactive application of punitive damages would raise a serious constitutional question." Landgraf,511 U.S. at 281. In
addition, the CWA subjects Defendant to criminal penalties, 33 U.S.C. § 1319(a)-(c)
(1994), and retroactive penal legislation is particularly disfavored. See Landgraf,511
U.S. at 266. Finally, when most recently faced with a similar issue, the Court did not
retroactively apply a change in the ability of a prisoner to pursue the prospective
relief of habeas corpus. Lindh, 521 U.S. at 342 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
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There is nothing unusual or inequitable about this result.
"The principle that statutes operate only prospectively, while judicial decisions operate retroactively, is familiar to every law student." United States v.Sec. Ind.Bank, 459 U.S. 70, 79 (1982).
In light of the foregoing analysis, the amendment would have
a retroactive effect, and there is neither an express congressional
statement nor clear legislative intent as to temporal reach of the
enactment. Therefore, it should not apply to this or any case
pending when the amendment became law, and the Court should
affirm the district court's holding that there is no statutory basis
for federal regulation of Sheldrake Pond.
C.

The Amendment Would Unconstitutionally Extend the CWA
to Sheldrake Pond

The EPA's definition (now the statutory definition) is extremely broad, extending to "all other waters... the use, degradation, or destruction of which would affect or could affect interstate
or foreign commerce . . . ." 40 C.F.R. § 122.2. It is difficult to imagine any waters exempted from that definition. Thus, if applied
retroactively, the amendment probably extends federal regulatory
jurisdiction to Sheldrake Pond. As applied, however, the new definition does not comport with the Constitution.
II.

NEITHER THE COMMERCE CLAUSE NOR THE
TREATY POWER SUPPORT FEDERAL
REGULATION OF SHELDRAKE POND

A delicate division of power between the three coordinate
branches and between federal and state defines our system of government. See, e.g., Alden v. Maine, 527 U.S. 706, 713 (1999). A
"healthy balance of power between the States and the Federal
Government" is needed to "reduce the risks of tyranny and abuse
from either front." Gregory v. Ashcroft, 501 U.S. 452, 458 (1991).
To that end, the United States Constitution provided for a limited
federal government and delegated to it those powers necessary to
ensure a stable Union. See Art. I, § 8. It is only with respect to
those few and defined powers that the federal government may
act, and any action taken in excess of or beyond those powers is
invalid. See, e.g., Lopez, 514 U.S. at 552. Because federal regulation of Sheldrake Pond is beyond the purview of the Commerce
Clause and does not implicate the treaty power, the CWA cannot
constitutionally be applied to the pond.
19
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Sheldrake Pond Cannot be Regulated Pursuant to the
Commerce Clause

The Commerce Clause empowers Congress to "regulate Commerce with foreign nations and among the several states." U.S.
CONST. art. I, § 8. Only conduct that is both commerce and interstate in effect, at least in the aggregate, is within the reach of Congress. See, e.g., Lopez, 514 U.S. at 553. Accordingly, the Supreme
Court established three categories of activity that contain the requisite nexus to interstate commerce. "First, Congress may regulate the use of the channels of interstate commerce. Second,
Congress is empowered to regulate and protect the instrumentalities of interstate commerce, or person or things in interstate commerce ....
Finally, Congress' commerce authority includes the
power to regulate those ... activities that substantially affect interstate commerce." Id. at 558-59 (citations omitted); see also
United States v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 529 U.S. 598, 609 (2000).
None of these categories allow for federal regulation of Sheldrake
Pond.
1.

Sheldrake Pond is not a "channel of interstate
commerce.

In Lopez, the Court held that the Gun-Free School Zones Act
of 1990, which prohibited firearm possession in school zones, could
not be sustained as a regulation of the channels of interstate commerce, because it did not regulate "the use of the channels of interstate commerce, nor [was] it an attempt to prohibit the interstate
transportation of a commodity through the channels of interstate
commerce .... ." 514 U.S. at 558-59. That conclusion was easy for
the Lopez Court because the term "channels of interstate commerce" is limited to those objects that facilitate the interstate
transportation of persons or commodities and the activities intimately associated with such transportation. See, e.g., Lopez, 514
U.S. at 558-59; accord Heart of Atlanta Motel, Inc. v. United
States, 379 U.S. 249, 255-56 (1964); United States v. Darby, 312
U.S. 100, 113-14 (1941).
That limitation is controlling here as well. The migration of
birds obviously does not involve the interstate transportation of
persons. Nor are wild migratory birds commodities. It is well settled that migratory birds (and all wild animals) are ferae naturae
and as such incapable of ownership without possession. See, e.g.,
Missouri v. Holland, 252 U.S. 416, 434 (1920). As migratory birds
https://digitalcommons.pace.edu/pelr/vol20/iss1/20
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alighting on or near Sheldrake Pond are not and have never been
owned, it is difficult to imagine how the birds could be considered
a "commodity," which is "[a]n article of trade or commerce . . .
[and] embraces only tangible goods, such as products or merchandise." BLACK'S LAW DICTIoNARY 267 (7th ed. 1999). Wild birds are
not "products or merchandise." Nor are they in "trade or commerce." Until a migratory bird is killed or captured, it cannot be a
tangible good; until the bird is bought or sold, it is not in "trade or
commerce." 10 At that point, federal regulation may indeed be appropriate, but not before.
In addition, as the district court concluded, the assertion
pressed by BOG and the EPA "sweeps too broadly." (R. at 7).
Their argument would transform any place where migratory birds
stop or take refuge with any regularity into a channel of interstate
commerce. (R. at 7). The Supreme Court has inveighed against
regulations that have no identifiable stopping point. See, e.g., Lopez, 514 U.S. at 564. A holding that Sheldrake Pond is a channel
of interstate commerce simply because it is visited by migratory
birds would extend federal regulatory jurisdiction beyond all previously known limits.
The pond's isolated temporal nature makes it virtually inconceivable that it could be used for the interstate transportation of
commodities in any other manner. Therefore, this Court should
affirm the district court's conclusion that neither the use of a
channel of interstate commerce, nor the regulation of a commodity
in interstate commerce is at issue here.
2.

Sheldrake Pond is not an "instrumentalityof interstate
commerce."

In the court below, BOG asserted that migratory birds are
"instrumentalities of interstate commerce." (R. at 7). It is first
worth noting that BOG and the EPA do not intend to regulate mi10. Judge Wald's opinion in Nat'l Ass'n. of Home Builders v. Babbitt, 130 F.3d
1041 (D.C. Cir. 1997), that a "taking" of endangered species can be regulated as a

channel of interstate commerce is unpersuasive. First, Judge Wald failed to convince
either of her colleagues. Id. at 1063 (Sentelle, J., dissenting). Second, the "channels
of interstate commerce" embraces only the "movement of persons or things interstate." Id. at 1058 (Henderson, J., concurring). Finally, the Court in Darby and Heart
of Atlanta did not sustain the statutes because they protected the channels of interstate commerce from immoral purposes, but in spite of the fact that Congress had
legislated for moral reasons. See Darby, 312 U.S. at 115; Heartof Atlanta, 379 U.S. at

257.
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gratory birds,'1 but rather Sheldrake Pond. (R. at 1). Thus, the
Court would need to hold that the pond (not the birds) is an instrumentality of interstate commerce. As Sheldrake Pond is intrastate, isolated, and stationary, such a conclusion is untenable.
In any case, their argument stretches the term "instrumentalities"
beyond all meaning.
"Instrumentalities of interstate commerce" embraces the vehicles that actually travel across state lines-the railroads, cars,
trucks, airplanes-and the operators of such vehicles. See Lopez,
514 U.S. at 558-59 (citations omitted). That is, the "instrumentalities of interstate commerce" are those objects that facilitate the
interstate transportation of commodities or persons. See id.
Nothing of the sort is at issue here, and the term has not since
been expanded. See Morrison, 529 U.S. at 609.
As discussed, "[it is pure fantasy to talk of'owning' wild fish,
birds, or animals." Douglas v. Seacoast Products, Inc., 431 U.S.
265, 284 (1977). So too of commanding or using migratory birds to
transport commodities or persons across state lines. Cf Lopez,
514 U.S. at 558-59. The obvious logistical impossibilities aside,
they go where instinct dictates and creative arguments to the contrary do not make it otherwise. Thus, Sheldrake Pond cannot be
regulated as an instrumentality of interstate commerce.
3.

Suave's activities do not "substantiallyaffect interstate
commerce."

The first step in this analysis is to "evaluate the precise object
or activity that, in the aggregate, substantially affects interstate
commerce." SWANCC, 531 U.S. at 173. In the court below, BOG
and the EPA asserted that "[Suave's] activities substantially affect the interstate commerce of hunting and observing migratory
birds or that the aggregate of activities like [Suave's] substantially affects such commerce." (R. at 7). These arguments lack
merit. An indirect and attenuated connection to interstate commerce is insufficient to justify federal regulation. Lopez, 514 U.S.
at 567. Courts will not "pile inference upon inference in a manner
that would bid fair to convert congressional authority under the
Commerce Clause to a general police power of the sort retained by
the States." Id. Rather, the activity in question, at least in the
11. BOG relied on Missouri v. Holland to support this argument. (R. at 7). As the
district court noted, however, the Court in Missouri did not hold that migratory birds
are instrumentalities of interstate commerce. See 252 U.S. at 430; accord (R. at 7).
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aggregate, must itself and in fact substantially affect interstate
commerce. Id. at 559.
Accordingly, the Court in Morrison recognized four considerations to be examined in determining whether federal regulation is
justified under the third category. First, is "the activity in question some sort of economic endeavor." Morrison, 529 U.S. at 611.
Second, does the law contain "an express jurisdictional element
which limits its reach." Id. (quoting Lopez, 514 U.S. at 562).
Third, are there "express congressional findings regarding the [effect] upon interstate commerce[.]" Id. at 612 (quoting Lopez, 514
U.S. at 562). Finally, is the "link between [the regulated activity]
and a substantial effect on interstate commerce attenuated." Id.
a.

The regulated activity is not an "economic
endeavor."

BOG and the EPA do not seek to regulate an "economic activity." Indeed, the CWA has little to do with commerce. The Act is
intended to "restore and maintain the chemical, physical and biological integrity of Nation's waters[.]" 33 U.S.C. § 1251(a) (1994).
This goal is laudable, but the Court has never sustained the regulation of a noneconomic intrastate activity under the Commerce
Clause. Lopez, 514 U.S. at 560. "[T]hus far in our Nation's history
[the Court has] upheld Commerce Clause regulation of intrastate
activity only where that activity is economic in nature." Morrison,
529 U.S. at 613.
In Lopez, for example, the Court held that the Gun-Free
School Zone Act of 1990 did not regulate economic activity. 514
U.S. at 561. In reaching this conclusion, the Court reasoned that
the Act was "a criminal statute that by its terms has nothing to do
with 'commerce' or any sort of economic enterprise, however
broadly one might define those terms." Id. The Court also recognized that in our federal system, "the 'States possess primary authority for defining and enforcing the criminal law."' Id. at 561
n.3 (quoting Brecht v. Abrahamson, 507 U.S. 619, 635 (1993)). Finally, the Court concluded that the statute was "not an essential
part of a larger regulation of economic activity, in which the regulatory scheme could be undercut unless the intrastate activity
were regulated." Id. at 561. Therefore, the court held, the statute
could not "be sustained under [the] cases upholding regulations of
activities that arise out of or are connected with a commercial
transaction, which viewed in the aggregate substantially affects
interstate commerce." Id.
23
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This case parallels Lopez in many respects. First, the discharge of fill or pollution into navigable waters without a 33
U.S.C. § 1342 or § 1344 permit subjects the offender to criminal
penalties. See 33 U.S.C. § 1319(a)-(c). Second, land and water use
regulation is traditionally a state concern. See e.g., SWANCC, 531
U.S. at 174. Indeed, in the CWA "Congress chose 'to recognize,
preserve, and protect the primary responsibilities and rights of
States to prevent, reduce, and eliminate pollution.... ."' Id. at 167
(quoting 33 U.S.C. § 1251(b) (1994)). Finally, the regulation of
Sheldrake Pond is not an essential part of a larger regulation of
economic activity. See 33 U.S.C. §§ 1251-1387 (1994). Therefore,
whatever the regulation of Sheldrake Pond is, it is not the regulation of an economic endeavor.
b.

There is no express jurisdictional element to limit
the reach of the regulation

Superficially, the CWA and accompanying regulations contain
a jurisdictional element. The Act applies to "navigable waters,"
which means "waters of the United States." 33 U.S.C. § 1362(7).
So too the EPA's definition of "waters of the United States," which
Congress has now adopted, limits regulatory jurisdiction to those
waters "the use, degradation or destruction of which would affect
or could affect interstate or foreign commerce.. . ." 40 C.F.R.
§ 122.2. This, however, is a limitation without substance. If federal jurisdiction attaches whenever "the use of' waters "would or
could affect" interstate commerce, the EPA may regulate every
pool of water or wetland in the entire country, because there will
be always be the possibility that a particular activity could affect
interstate commerce. See United States v. Larkins, 852 F.2d 189,
193 (6th Cir. 1988) (Merritt, J., concurring).
It is also significant that the test for whether an activity is
within the purview of the Commerce Clause is not whether the
activity "would or could affect" interstate commerce, but whether
the activity substantially affects interstate commerce. Lopez, 514
U.S. at 559. This limitation reveals that the purported jurisdictional element fails to comport with constitutional requirements.
See id. Indeed, the Fourth Circuit concluded as much in Wilson.
See 133 F.3d at 257. Consequently, there is no jurisdictional element to "ensure, through case-by-case inquiry," that the activity
in question in fact substantially affects interstate commerce, Lopez, 514 U.S. at 561, and nothing prevents the EPA from acting in
excess of constitutionally prescribed limits.
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The legislative history does not contain express
findings regarding the substantial effect that
filling isolated ponds has on interstate
commerce

Before the recent amendment, Congress made no findings regarding the substantial effect that filling or polluting isolated, intrastate ponds has on interstate commerce. See Wilson, 133 F.3d
at 257. Indeed, the Court in SWANCC examined the legislative
history of the CWA and found nothing that indicated "Congress
intended to exert anything more than its commerce power over
navigation." 531 U.S. at 168 n.3. The Court also determined that
Congress intended the term "navigable" to convey some independent meaning. Id. at 172. These conclusions belie any argument
that Congress concluded filling or polluting ponds like Sheldrake
will have a substantial effect on interstate commerce. Instead,
they establish a congressional intent to exclude isolated, non-navigable waters from regulation. See id. at 172-74.
The recent amendment does not alter this conclusion. The
amendment itself was silent as to the nexus between isolated waters and interstate commerce. (R. at 5-6). The accompanying Senate Committee Report made certain statements regarding the
importance of migratory birds and the expenditures associated
with recreational hunting and observation, but it did not conclude
that the "use, degradation or destruction" of ponds like Sheldrake
would have a substantial effect on interstate commerce. See S.
REP. No. 106-528, at 23 (2001). In any case, as the district court
noted, the report does not suffice to prove a factual issue. (R. at 7).
Indeed, the Court in Morrison rejected much clearer and more detailed congressional findings as insufficient "to sustain the constitutionality of Commerce Clause legislation." 529 U.S. at 614.
d.

The link between pollution in Sheldrake Pond and a
substantial effect on interstate commerce is
particularly attenuated

Sheldrake Pond itself is neither economic nor interstate in nature. (R. at 3-4, 7). To overcome this fatal flaw, BOG and the EPA
rely on activities removed, in varying degrees, from the pond. (R.
at 7). For example, it is certainly true that "millions of people
spend billions of dollars annually on recreational pursuits relating
to migratory birds." SWANCC, 531 U.S. at 173. It is also true
that Defendant operates a skeet and rifle range near Sheldrake
25
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Pond. (R. at 3-4). These activities, however, are not the subject of
regulation. Rather, the regulated activity is water pollution. See
33 U.S.C. §§ 1251-1387; accord (R. at 1-3). Reliance on either the
economy of recreational pursuits relating to migratory birds or the
GRAPA operation to overcome the obvious lack of commerce in
filling or discharging materials into an isolated, intrastate pond is
exactly the type of sweeping and attenuated reasoning the Court
invalidated in Lopez and Morrison. See Lopez, 514 U.S. at 567;
Morrison, 529 U.S. 612-13.
For example, the Court in Lopez rejected the government's assertion that violent crime around schools affected interstate commerce because the cost of crime is substantial and reduced the
effectiveness of education. 514 U.S. at 563-64. The argument has
merit, but the Court refused to concern itself with inferential reasoning. Id. at 567. Similarly, in Morrison, the Court acknowledged that Congress expressly found that gender-motivated
violence affected interstate commerce by deterring potential victims from engaging in employment and commerce, thereby reducing national productivity. 529 U.S. at 615. Instead of considering
the truth of that assertion, the Court dismissed it as based upon
"a method of reasoning rejected as unworkable if we are to maintain the Constitution's enumeration of powers." Id.
The "method of reasoning" rejected in Morrison and Lopez is
precisely the type that BOG and the EPA employ here. The Court
would be required examine activities incidental to Sheldrake
Pond, and then assume that those activities, at least in the aggregate, will "substantially affect interstate commerce." That is an
attenuated argument based solely on assumption and inference.
The jurisprudence countenances against taking that course.
Thus, each of the considerations identified in Morrison point
to the inescapable fact that the alleged fill and pollution of Sheldrake Pond does not substantially affect interstate commerce. In
light of the foregoing, the Court should affirm the district court's
conclusion that the Commerce Clause does not support federal
12
regulation of Sheldrake Pond.

12. Uniformly, the opinions sustaining federal regulation of isolated intrastate
waters against a Commerce Clause challenge were decided before Morrison, and
therefore lacked the benefit of the Court's latest and most specific guidance. See Solid
Waste Agency v. United States Army Corps of Eng'rs, 191 F.3d 845 (7th Cir. 1999);
United States v. Pozsgai, 999 F.2d 719, 733-34 (3d Cir. 1993); Hoffman Homes, Inc. v.
EPA, 999 F.2d 256, 261 (7th Cir. 1993); Leslie Salt Co., 896 F.2d at 1360.
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The Treaty Power May Not be Used to Regulate Sheldrake
Pond
The President has the "[plower, by and with the Advice and

Consent of the Senate, to make Treaties.... ." U.S. CONST. art. II,
§ 2. When the United States becomes a signatory to a treaty, Congress may act to make any provisions or purposes of that treaty
binding on the people and the states. See Missouri, 252 U.S. at
431; Neely v. Henkel, 180 U.S. 109, 121 (1901). Neither the executive nor the judiciary, however, has the power to legislate, U.S.
CONST. art. I, § 1; see also Hampton v. Mow Sun Wong, 426 U.S.
88, 114 (1976); Kent v. Dulles, 357 U.S. 116, 129 (1958), and the
extent of Congress' implementation power is not before the Court.
Congress enacted the CWA pursuant to Commerce Clause,
not the treaty power. See, e.g., Riverside, 474 U.S. at 133; see also
40 C.F.R. § 122.2 (referring to an effect on interstate commerce as
the basis for jurisdiction); Guzy Memorandum, supra, at 4. One
statement in the report of a Senate Committee acting nearly
thirty years after the CWA became law does not rewrite history,
particularly when the report does not identify the treaties to
which it refers or on which amendment purports to rely. See. S.
REP. No. 106-528, at 23 (2001). Consequently, any effort to weld
the CWA to the treaty power is hollow.
A ruling in Suave's favor, however, would not affect the validity of any law or treaty. Nor does Suave attack the national effort
to protect and preserve migratory birds. See 16 U.S.C. §§ 703-711
(1994); 16 U.S.C. §§ 715-715s (1994); see also North Dakota v.
United States, 460 U.S. 300 (1983). Those laws and underlying
treaties, which generally do not regulate habitat, or do so only
with consent of the states or through compulsory purchase, remain intact. See 16 U.S.C. § 703; 16 U.S.C. § 715f; see also North
Dakota, 460 U.S. 300. The issue before the Court is simply distinct and unrelated to the treaty power or those laws.
In light of the foregoing analysis, Sheldrake Pond cannot constitutionally be regulated pursuant to the Commerce Clause or
the treaty power. Water pollution is certainly a serious problem,
and Sheldrake Pond and the migratory birds that visit it may well
require protection. The solution, however, is not an "end-run"
around the Constitution. In this case, such protection is properly
left to the state.
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SHOT AND SKEET USED FOR ITS INTENDED
PURPOSE IS NOT SOLID WASTE FOR
PURPOSES OF REGULATION AND
REMEDIATION

Fired shot and skeet parts are not "solid waste" when they fall
to the ground as that term is used in RCRA. See 42 U.S.C.
§§ 6972(a), 6903(27) (1994). Material must be solid waste in order
to invoke RCRA's jurisdiction. See, e.g., Connecticut Coastal Fishermen's Ass'n v. Remington Arms Co., 989 F.2d 1305, 1313 (2d Cir.
1993). In the instant case, the shot and skeet used for its intended
purpose is outside the scope of material that Congress intended to
regulate when it enacted RCRA. See Water Keeper Alliance v. Department of Defense, 152 F. Supp. 2d 163, 169 (D.P.R. 2001). To
interpret the statute otherwise, for instance to interpret shot and
skeet to be simultaneously used and discarded when it falls to the
ground, would create the absurd result of requiring RCRA permits
with the sale of all bullets.
Both the statutory and regulatory provisions of RCRA define
the term "solid waste." Compare 42 U.S.C. § 6903(27), with EPA
Solid Wastes, 40 C.F.R. § 261.2(a) (1999). Jurisdiction under either definition requires that the material be discarded. See Water
Keeper, 152 F. Supp. 2d at 169. Accordingly, courts have held that
products such as munitions and insecticide cannot "be considered
discarded until some time after they have served their intended
purpose." Id. at 168; see also No Spray Coalition, Inc. v. City of
New York, No. 00-5395JSM, 2000 WL 1401458, at *4 (S.D.N.Y.
Sept. 25, 2000). Thus, this court should affirm the district court's
dismissal of BOG's citizen suit under RCRA for lack of
jurisdiction.
A.

BOG Fails to Meet Minimum Jurisdictional Requirements
Under RCRA Because the Shot and Skeet Used for Its
Intended Purpose is not Discarded

Through RCRA, Congress granted the EPA the jurisdiction to
regulate and remediate solid and hazardous wastes. Solid wastes
are regulated under Subtitle D of the statute. See 42 U.S.C.
§§ 6941-49a (1994). Hazardous wastes are a subset of solid waste
and more stringently regulated under Subtitle C of RCRA. See 42
U.S.C. §§ 6903, 6921-39b (1994). "Because 'hazardous waste' is
defined as a subset of 'solid waste,' 42 U.S.C. § 6903(5), the scope
of EPA's jurisdiction is limited to those materials that constitute
https://digitalcommons.pace.edu/pelr/vol20/iss1/20
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'solid waste."' American Mining Congress v. EPA, 824 F.2d 1177,
1179 (D.C. Cir. 1987) ["AMC I"]; accord Ass'n of Battery Recyclers,
Inc. v. EPA, 208 F.3d 1047, 1056 (D.C. Cir. 2000).
BOG asserts two claims. First, that use of shot and skeet at
the GRAPA range amounts to hazardous waste disposal in violation of 42 U.S.C. § 6925(a) permitting requirements. (R. at 4).
Second, that the used shot and skeet parts creates an "imminent
and substantial endangerment" actionable under 42 U.S.C.
§ 6972(a)(1)(B). (R. at 4). Both allegations contort RCRA's definition of solid waste and the intent of Congress to regulate postconsumer waste. Consequently, the lower court properly dismissed the case because it fails to meet minimum jurisdictional
requirements under either provision.
The statute defines solid waste as "discarded material." 42
U.S.C. § 6903(27). The statute does not define the term discarded,
but the ordinary, plain meaning of the word "discard" is "to get rid
of esp. as useless or unpleasant." MERRIAM-WEBSTER'S COLLEGIATE DICTIONARY

330 (10th ed. 1999). In the instant case,

rather than discarded, the shot and skeet fired at GRAPA range
are ordinary products used for their intended purpose. See Water
Keeper, 152 F. Supp. 2d at 167 (citations omitted). Furthermore,
the EPA interprets its own regulations defining solid waste to exclude consumer products used for their intended purposes. 50
Fed. Reg. 614, 619 (1985). In short, "[n]ot being discarded material, these munitions cannot be considered solid waste." See Water
Keeper, 152 F. Supp. 2d at 169.
Solid waste is defined in both the statutory and regulatory
provisions of RCRA. See Remington, 989 F.2d at 1315. "Dual definitions of solid waste are suggested by the structure and language
of RCRA." Id. First, Congress explicitly defined solid waste
within the statute, inter alia, as "discarded material... resulting
from industrial, commercial, mining and agricultural operations,
and from community activities." 42 U.S.C. § 6903(27). Under
Subtitle D, the EPA is only authorized to publish "guidelines" for
non-hazardous waste management, thus the term solid waste does
not require further explanation beyond RCRA's statutory definition. See Remington, 989 F.2d at 1315 (comparing 42 U.S.C.
§ 6942(a) (1988) with § 6921(a) & (b) (1988)). Accordingly, the
statutory definition of solid waste under 42 U.S.C. § 6903(27) controls BOG's citizen suit under § 6972(a)(1)(B). See Remington, 989
F.2d at 1315.
29
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Second, recognizing that more stringent regulation is required for hazardous waste under Subtitle C, Congress explicitly
directed the Administrator of the EPA to "develop and promulgate
criteria for identifying the characteristics of hazardous waste, and
for listing hazardous waste, which should be subject to regulation
under subchapter III." 42 U.S.C. § 6921(a) (1994). For purposes
of hazardous waste regulation, the EPA adopted a narrower regulatory definition of solid waste as "any discarded material" which
is further defined, among other things, as "abandoned." 13 40
C.F.R. § 261.2(a) (emphasis added). This narrower, regulatory
definition of solid waste, however, "applies only to wastes that also
are hazardous for purposes of the regulations implementing Subtitle C of RCRA." 40 C.F.R. § 261.1(b)(1) (1999). Accordingly, the
regulatory definition of solid waste applies to BOG's citizen suit
under Section 6972(a)(1)(A) (1994). See Remington, 989 F.2d at
1315.
In the instant case, fired shot and skeet parts are neither "discarded material" as defined by 42 U.S.C. § 6903(27), nor "abandoned" as defined by 40 C.F.R. § 261.2. Rather, shot and skeet fall
within the category of activities exempt from the statute's jurisdiction "because they are like ordinary usage of commercial products." See AMC I, 824 F.2d at 1180 (citing 50 Fed. Reg. 614, 619);
see also Water Keeper, 152 F. Supp. 2d at 168. In AMC I, the
Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia held that the term
discarded conformed to its plain and ordinary meaning, thus "discarded" refers to material "disposed of, abandoned, or thrown
away." 824 F.2d at 1193. Although subsequent decisions of the
D.C. Circuit limited the application of this holding, these decisions
only concerned the proper scope of the EPA's regulatory jurisdiction with regard to recycling of secondary materials such as metalbearing sludge and slag resulting from industrial production. See,
e.g., American Petroleum Inst. v. EPA, 906 F.2d 729 (D.C. Cir.
1990) ["APP'];American Mining Congress v. EPA, 907 F.2d 1179
(D.C. Cir. 1990) ["AMC IF']. "Congress clearly and unambiguously
expressed its intent that 'solid waste' (and therefore EPA's regulatory authority) be limited to materials that are 'discarded."' Id.
Ordinary use of shot and skeet results in fired shot and skeet
parts that fall to the ground. "RCRA does not support Plaintiffs'
contention that munitions become discarded material immedi13. Material is deemed abandoned if it is "disposed of." 40 C.F.R. § 261.2(b)(1)
(1999). See Appendix B-4 for the statutory definition of "disposal."
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ately upon being fired." See Water Keeper, 152 F. Supp. 2d at 169.
Similarly, fired shot and skeet parts are not discarded when they
fall to the ground because ordinary and intended use of products is
outside RCRA's definition of solid waste. Thus, the district court
correctly concluded that use of these products at GRAPA range is
not within RCRA's jurisdiction. (R. at 11).
B.

The Intended Use Exception Serves RCRA's Purpose and
Intent to Regulate Post-Consumer Waste

When enacting RCRA, Congress did not intend to regulate
consumer products used for their intended purpose. The legislative history behind RCRA reveals that the objective of the bill was
to address the "danger posed by improper disposal of discarded
materials." Introduction of the Resource Conservation and Recovery Act of 1976, 122 CONG. REC. H19,764 (1976). Also evident is
that Congress intended to limit the term solid waste to only those
materials disposed of after their intended use.
For example, in introducing RCRA to the House of Representatives, Rep. Rooney noted: "This country is the most productive
society in the history of the"world: a fact reflected in the amount of
materials which need to be disposed of after their intended use."
Id. (emphasis added). In subsequent hearings, Rep. Rooney reaffirmed this basic assumption regarding the limits of the term solid
waste, stating: "This act has as its objective the proper disposal of
all materials after their intended use." H. R. REP. No. 94-103, at 1
(1976) (emphasis added). Given RCRA's legislative record, Congress could not have intended to regulate consumer products as
they are ordinarily used for their intended purpose. Thus, an intended use exception for shot and skeet accords with both Congressional intent and common sense. Further supporting this
reading, the EPA interprets its own regulatory definition of solid
waste to exclude shot and skeet used for its intended purpose.
C.

The EPA's Regulatory Definition of "Solid Waste" Excluding
Shot and Skeet Used for Its Intended Purpose is
Controlling

BOG alleges that use of shot and skeet is disposal of hazardous waste without a permit in violation of Subtitle C, 40 C.F.R.
§ 261.2, and thus is subject to regulation and enforcement under
42 U.S.C. § 6972(a)(1)(A). To interpret discarded material as including fired shot and skeet would require the material be simul31
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taneously used and discarded when it falls to the ground. Such an
interpretation, however, is untenable.
Under current EPA policy, "[1ead shot is not considered a
hazardous waste subject to RCRA at the time it is discharged from
a firearm because it is used for its intended purpose." Environmental Protection Agency, Best Management Practices for Lead
at Outdoor Shooting Ranges, http://www.epa.gov/region2/waste/
leadshot; see also Long Island Soundkeeper Fund, Inc. v. New
York Athletic Club, No. 94 Civ. 0436, 1996 WL 131863, at *9
(S.D.N.Y. Mar. 22, 1996). The EPA's interpretation excluding discharged lead shot is in accord with both the regulation and the
plain language and intent of the statute. Thus, the court below
correctly concluded that the "EPA's interpretation of its own regulations defining solid waste as not including consumer products
used for their intended purposes is dispositive." (R. at 9); see also
Military Toxics Project v. EPA, 146 F.3d 948, 956 (D.C. Cir. 1998)
(citations omitted).
1. The EPA's intended use exception requires Chevron
deference
When circumstances imply that Congress expected the EPA
to speak with the force of law to address an ambiguity in the
RCRA statute, the court must accept that resolution. See United
States v. Mead Corporation, 121 S. Ct. 2164, 2172 (2001) (citing
Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Res. Def Council, Inc., 467 U.S.
837, 845-46 (1984)). Analysis of the regulatory definition of solid
waste entails statutory interpretation as outlined in Mead. 121 S.
Ct. at 2171. Where "Congress has 'explicitly left a gap for an
agency to fill, there is an express delegation of authority to the
agency to elucidate a specific provision of the statute by regulation."' Id. (quoting Chevron, 467 U.S. at 843-44). "[Any ensuing
regulation is binding in the courts unless procedurally defective,
arbitrary or capricious in substance, or manifestly contrary to the
statute.
Id.; see also 5 U.S.C. § 706(2) (1994). Furthermore, a court "is
obliged to accept the agency's position if Congress has not previously spoken to the point at issue and the agency's interpretation
is reasonable." Mead, 121 S. Ct. at 2172 (citing Chevron, 467 U.S.
at 842-45).
Congress may explicitly or implicitly delegate authority to an
agency. Express delegation exists where Congress explicitly left a
gap for agency to fill and any ensuing regulation is binding unless
https://digitalcommons.pace.edu/pelr/vol20/iss1/20
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procedurally defective. See id. at 2171. Relevant here is that Congress explicitly directed the Administrator of the EPA to "develop
and promulgate criteria for identifying the characteristics of hazardous waste, [14] which should be subject to the provisions of this
subchapter." 42 U.S.C. § 6921(a). In addition, Congress authorized the Administrator of the EPA to "prescribe, in consultation
with Federal, State, and regional authorities, such regulations as
are necessary to carry out his functions under this chapter." 42
U.S.C. § 6912(a)(1) (1994). Both provisions evidence express delegation of authority.
Alternatively, the Supreme Court has recognized that "even
without express authority to fill a specific statutory gap, circumstances pointing to implicit congressional delegation present a
particularly insistent call for deference." Mead, 121 S. Ct. at
2172-73. Similar to the Chevron deference accorded to an express
delegation, an implicit delegation of authority by Congress to the
agency to "fill a particular gap" may be "apparent from the
agency's generally conferred authority and other statutory circumstances that Congress would expect the agency to be able to
speak with the force of law when it addresses ambiguity in the
statute or fills a space in the enacted law." Id. at 2172 (citing
Chevron, 467 U.S. at 845).
It is apparent from the ambiguity present in the potentially
limitless definition of solid waste that Congress delegated authority to the EPA to determine the jurisdictional limits of its own regulatory definition of solid waste. See AMC H, 907 F.2d at 1186;
API, 906 F.2d at 740-41. Thus, as an agency administering its
own statute, the EPA meets the first of the two step Chevron inquiry because Congress has not "directly spoken to the precise
question at issue." Chevron, 467 U.S. at 842. Furthermore, the
EPA's intended use exception meets the second prong of the Chevron test because, as discussed below, the EPA's interpretation is a
permissible construction of the statue.
2.

The EPA's intended use exception is a permissible
construction of the statute

Applying "Chevron deference," 15 the Court of Appeals for the
District of Columbia denied a petition for review of the final Mili14. See Appendix B-4 for the statutory definition of "hazardous waste."
15. As noted above, Congress has expressly delegated authority to the EPA to
promulgate rules for the regulation of hazardous waste, therefore the outcome of Military Toxics Project would be the same under a Mead analysis.
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tary Munitions Rule ("MMR") promulgated by the EPA. See Military Toxics Project, 146 F.3d at 950. The court held that the
MMR, which created a Subtitle C conditional exemption for military munitions, was a permissible construction of RCRA,
"[because the EPA's interpretation of its own regulation is
neither plainly erroneous nor inconsistent with the regulation,
[the court accepted] it as controlling." Id. The court recognized it
could only set aside the EPA's action in promulgating the MMR if
it were found to be "arbitrary, capricious, an abuse of discretion or
otherwise not in accordance with law." Id. at 954 (citing 42 U.S.C.
§ 6976(a) (1994); 5 U.S.C. § 706(a)(2) (1994)).
The court acknowledged the EPA's intended use exemption
under the MMR is "but one example of its 'longstanding interpretation' of the regulatory definition of solid waste as excluding
products, such as pesticides and fertilizers, the intended use of
which involves application to the land." Military Toxics Project,
146 F.3d at 955. Emphasizing the legitimacy of the ordinary use
exception, the court contrasted EPA regulation 40 C.F.R.
§ 261.2(c)(1)(B)(ii) (1998) ("commercial chemical products . . .are
not solid wastes if they are applied to the land and that is their
ordinary manner of use") with EPA regulation 40 C.F.R. § 261.33
(1998) (listing commercial chemicals that are hazardous wastes
"when they are otherwise applied to the land in lieu of their intended use"). Id. The EPA set forth other examples of the ordinary use exception, noting "the use of explosives (e.g., dynamite)
for road clearing, construction, or mining does not trigger RCRA
regulation, even though any residuals on the ground serve no further function." 16 62 Fed. Reg. 6622, 6630 (Feb. 12, 1997) (relevant
portions codified at 40 C.F.R. pt. 266). Similarly, the GRAPA activities do not trigger RCRA although the shot and skeet serve no
further function on the ground. Thus, "the EPA's reading [is] a
permissible construction of the statute." Military Toxics Project,
146 F.3d at 958.
In promulgating the final MMR, the EPA noted that Subtitle
C regulations do not extend "to products that are used in their
normal manner. In EPA's opinion, the use of munitions does not
constitute a waste management activity because the munitions
are not 'discarded.' Rather, the firing of munitions is within the
16. Further justifying the MMR regulatory exception, the EPA noted that the
"waste might pose a hazard only under limited management scenarios, and other regulatory programs already address such scenarios." Military Toxics Project, 146 F.3d
at 958 (citing 62 Fed. Reg. at 6636).
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normal and expected use of the product." 62 Fed. Reg. at 6630 (emphasis added). Using similar reasoning, other courts have reviewed and upheld other EPA policies that applied the intended
use exception to exempt normal and expected use of a product
from RCRA regulation. See Long Island Soundkeeper Fund, 1996
WL 131863, at *7 (holding that the EPA's inclusion of a proper
and expected use exception into its own regulations is reasonable,
and therefore spent shot and target fragments do not fall within
the regulatory definition of "solid waste" under RCRA).
In contrast, the court in United States v. ILCO, Inc. upheld
EPA policy and regulations that deemed spent battery components "part of the waste disposal problem" once the original consumer discarded the battery. 996 F.2d 1126, 1131-32 (11th Cir.
1993). With regard to a battery, the intended use is wholly unrelated to its subsequent discard. In contrast, firing shot at skeet is
intrinsic to its use. Thus, to interpret a fired shot to be simultaneously used and discarded when it falls to the ground would effectively regulate shooting of all bullets under RCRA. Statutory
interpretations that lead to absurd results, however, should be
avoided.
In this instance, Congress has delegated the necessary authority to the EPA to create an intended use exception under the
regulatory definition of solid waste for non-military lead shot and
skeet. Furthermore, the EPA's policy is reasonable and in accord
with the statute's intent, therefore as the district court properly
noted, the EPA intended use exception controls.
D.

The Intended Use Exception Also Applies to Used Shot and
Skeet When They Fall to the Ground Under the
Statutory Definition of Solid Waste Applicable to the
42 U.S.C. § 6972(a)(1)(B) Suit

Common sense and consistency require that fired shot and
skeet parts that are not regulated as solid waste do not warrant
remedial activities as solid waste. (R. at 9). This accords with the
plain language of the statute as well. The lower court correctly
interpreted both the regulatory and statutory definitions of solid
waste to exclude shot and skeet used for its intended purpose. (R.
at 9). It is EPA policy, however, to read the statutory definition of
solid waste without the consumer use exception. This interpretation is plainly erroneous and inconsistent with prior EPA positions and the RCRA statute itself. Thus, it is not controlling.
35
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While the statutory definition of solid waste varies slightly
from the regulatory definition, the intended use exception should
apply with equal force. "[Tihe regulatory definition of solid waste
simply adds to the statutory definition the requirement that the
discarded material also be 'abandoned."' Water Keeper, 152 F.
Supp. 2d at 167 n.4. "[B]oth definitions contain the term discarded material. Thus any definition of discarded material, even
if provided by the [regulation], is instructive." See id. at 168. The
Water Keeper court, citing to the District of Columbia Circuit's review of the MMR in Military Toxics Project, extended the regulatory exemption to the statutory definition of solid waste. The
court interpreted the exemption broadly based on EPA policy and
reasoning that "the use of munitions does not constitute a waste
management activity because the munitions are not 'discarded."'
Id. (citations omitted).
The weight accorded to an administrative judgment "will depend upon the thoroughness evident in its consideration, the validity of its reasoning, its consistency with earlier and later
pronouncements, and all those factors which give it power to persuade, if lacking power to control." 17 Mead, 121 S. Ct. 2164 (quoting Skidmore v. Swift & Co., 323 U.S. 134, 140 (1944)). "An
agency interpretation of a relevant provision which conflicts with
the agency's earlier interpretation is entitled to considerably less
deference' than a consistently held agency view." INS v. CardozaFonseca, 480 U.S. 421 n.30 (1987) (citations omitted). Furthermore, "[i]f a court, employing traditional tools of statutory construction, ascertains that Congress had an intention on the
precise question at issue, that intention is the law and must be
given effect." Chevron, 467 U.S. at 843, n.9.
Here, the EPA's distinction between the regulatory and statutory definition of solid waste is arbitrary, contrary to Congressional intent and unrelated to the EPA's reasoning for applying
the regulatory consumer use exception. As explained by the EPA
when promulgating the MMR, the agency "focuses on whether a
product was used as it was intended to be used, not on whether
the purpose of the product is to perform some function once on the
ground." 62 Fed. Reg. at 6630. Given this reasoning, there is no
rational explanation to read the statutory definition of solid waste
17. This deference arises from the "value of the uniformity of an agency's administrative and judicial understandings" required by the highly detailed regulatory
schemes necessary to implement national law. Mead, 121 S. Ct. at 2175 (citations
omitted) (emphasis added).
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without the intended use exception. Indeed, the EPA has never
formally provided any rationale for this distinction. Failing "to
provide a rational explanation for its decision" renders the EPA
decision arbitrary and capricious. American Petroleum Inst. v.
EPA, 216 F.3d 50, 58 (D.C. Cir. 2000); see also AMC 11, 907 F.2d at
1191. Thus, the EPA policy to read the statutory definition of
solid waste without the intended use exception is arbitrary and
capricious.
Similarly, the court in No Spray Coalition recognized that it
was contrary to the statutory language and Congressional intent
of RCRA to hold that pesticide that has been sprayed but has yet
to reach the mosquitoes or their habitats is "discarded material"
under the statutory definition applicable to § 6972(a)(1)(B) citizen
suits. 2000 WL 1401458 at *4. Citing to Remington, for the proposition that material is not discarded until some time after it has
served its intended purpose, the court reasoned that the insecticide could not be discarded when it is sprayed because the intended purpose of the spray is to drift through the air until coming
to rest on the mosquitoes and their habitats. Id. at *4 (citing Remington, 989 F.2d at 1316). Likewise, the Water Keeper court applied this analysis to discharged munitions, holding that "neither
insecticide nor munitions become discarded at the time of their
release; rather, they cannot be considered discarded until some
time after they have served their intended purpose." 152 F. Supp.
2d at 168. Here, shot fired at skeet falls to the ground during its
ordinary use, thus as these courts have recognized, these materials are not discarded.
Moreover, the EPA's distinction between shot landing on the
GRAPA range as opposed to that landing off is equally arbitrary.
There is no uniformity. While place of landing might be relevant
to other, common law causes of action, it bears no relation to
whether a product was used as intended. As elaborated on by the
court in Water Keeper, this distinction runs contrary to the reasoning behind the EPA's regulatory exception for intended use. 152
F. Supp. 2d at 168-69.
"Regardless of whether the ordnance performs as the gunner
or bomber wishes, it is most certainly being used for its intended
purpose and is thus not discarded material under RCRA." Id. at
169. Alternatively, "taken to its logical conclusion, every piece of
ordnance that did not land precisely where it was intended would
be considered discarded material immediately upon being fired"
and such an extreme result could "not have been within Con37
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gress's contemplation in drafting RCRA." Id. Furthermore, the
EPA's distinction between shot landing on the GRAPA range and
that landing off is arbitrary and capricious because the agency has
failed "to provide a rational explanation for its decision." See AMC
11, 907 F.2d at 1191.
Finally, BOG and EPA attempt to rely on a previous decision
in this circuit, NeighborhoodAgainst Golf, Inc. v. Recreation Enterprises,Inc., 150 F.3d 1029 (12th Cir. 1999) ["NAG"] for the proposition that the consumer use exception does not apply to the
statutory definition of solid waste. (R. at 10-11). The Supreme
Court's decision in Mead, however, overruled NAG by implication.
As the district court correctly held, NAG cannot be relied upon as
controlling precedent because the court wrongly applied deference
rather than respect in its analysis of the EPA's interpretation. (R.
at 10). Thus, relying on NAG as controlling precedent would improperly bar courts in the Twelfth Circuit from the correct statutory interpretation.
As outlined above, the district court properly concluded that
skeet and shot when it falls to the ground is outside both the regulatory and statutory definition of solid waste, regardless of where
it lands. Thus, Suave respectfully requests this court to affirm the
lower court.
CONCLUSION
As outlined in the foregoing analysis, Suave respectfully requests this court to affirm the judgment of the district court in all
respects.
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